Recent Developments in Macroeocnomics by Stanley Fischer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN MACROECONOMICS
Stanley Fischer
Working Paper No. 2473
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
December 1987
The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Economic
Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Support from the Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.NBER Working Paper #2473
December 1987
Recent Developments in Macroeconomics
ABSTRACT
liii spaper surveysmuchof modern macroeconomics. The focusison the
corencroec onorni c Iuc, of the reasons for macr occonomi c {l uc tuat ions and
sometimespersistent unemployment. To provide continuity and porspectiv on
howpr omisi rigresercti leadsof the past turned out, the paper starts by
summarizing developments since the Barro-Fischer (i976) surveyofmonctary
enunc. Sections III aridIV developin somedetailthe current
representations of the two basic approaches to macroeconomics: the equilibrium
business cycle approach arid new Keynesianism respectively. Brief sketches of
developments in several areas of research in Section Vbroadenthe coverage.
Section VI contains concluding comments.
Stanley Fischer
S- 9035
The World Bank
1818 H Street
Washington, DC 20433Revised, December 1987.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MACROECONOMICS.
StanleyFischer.1
Underlyingthe existence ofmacroeconomics a; a separate field of
study are the phenomena of economy-wide fluctuation; of output arid prices, and
sometimes persistent high level; of unemployment. Twobasic view; of
macroeconomic behavior have persisted even a; conceptual innovation; and the
applicationof more powerful analytic and empiricaltechnique; have brought
significant change;in macroeconomic;.
Oneview and school of thought, associated with Keynes5 Keynesian; and
new Keynesian;, is that the private economy is subject to coordination
failuresthatcan produce excessive levelsofunemployment and excessive
fluctuation;in real activity. The other view, attributed to classical
economists, and espoused by monetarists and equilibrium business cycle
theorists, is that the private economy reaches as good an equilibrium a; is
possiblegiven government policy.
Anytwo—fold division of a complex, large and developing field of
study is inevitably a caricature, which cannot do justice to the subtleties of
the views of different individuals at a moment of time, the intricacies of the
1Departmerit of Economic;, MIT, and Research Associate, NBER. This survey
will appear in the Economic Journal.I am grateful to Olivier Blarichard,
Rudiger Dornbusch, Andrew Oswald, Danny Quab, Julio Rotemberg, and the
referees for helpful comments and/or discussions, and the National Science
Foundation for research support.I am especially indebted to Olivier
Blanchard, for I draw freely in this survey on material contained in our
forthcoming book (1988).2
developmentof the field over time, and the remarkable range of research
topics that fallunderthe headi rq of macroeconomic;. For instance, al though
theprot.agonists in the sixties were Keynesians and monetarists., in the
e)gtitiesare new Keynesians and equilibrium businesscycle theorists, thereis
aclear sense in which the views of Milton Friedman or Karl Brunner and Allan
Meltz er are closer tothoseof Keyriesi artsthan those of equilibrium busi ness
cycle theorists.2 Nonetheless, the caricature captures the essence of
macroeconomic controversies and provide; a useful organizing framework within
which to attempt a survey of a field that is too large for such an enterprise.
It appears thatmacroeconomics as such ha; not beensurveyed. The
classic 1962 Harry Johnson survey is of monetary economics.; Barro and Fischer
(1976) also survey monetary economics, though their definition of thesubject
issufficiently broad to encompass disequilibrium theory, which is more
macroeconomics than monetary economics. Rotemberg (1987) and Blanchard (1988)
each provide excellent survey; of part of the material discussed in this
paper.
The focus in this survey is on thecore issue, of the reason; for
macroeconomic fluctuations and sometimes persistent unemployment. To provide
continuity, arid perspective on how promising research lead; of the past turned
out, I start by summarizing in Sections 1and 11 development; since the Barro—
Fischer survey. The core of the survey Is contained in Section; III and IV
2Niltori Friedman's theoretical framework (1970)is close to the standard
lS—L.M model; BrunnerandMeltzer's(1976) basic analytic model isnot
dissimilar toTobin';(1969) three asset model. Friedman's view of the
macroeconomy as adjusting slowly and unpredictably to monetary policy is
very far from the modern real business cycle view that monetary policy
plays at most a minor role in macroeconomic fluctuations and that markets
are continually in equilibrium.
3Fischer (1987) also contains survey—like material.3
whichdescribe the current representations of the two basic approaches to
macroecoriomi cs theequili br i unibusi ness cycle appr och and newyresi Uii m
respectively.brief sketches of developments in several areas of research in
Section V broaden the perspective on the field.Section VI contidris
concludingcomments.
I.tI_4LLI!±'
Barro—Fischer(1976, written in 1975) describe their survey as
complementary with Harry Johnsons 1962 paper. This survey in turn can be
regardedascomplementary with Barro—Fi scher ,which classified resear clinto
seventopics.
LtiTheoro4Mo ny_Demand.
Theoreticalwork on the demand for money was a declining industry in
1975, and there has been only a brief subsequent revival. Akerlof and
tilibourne (1980) develop a target—threshhold model of the demand for money,
related to s—S models (Muller—Orr, 1966), in which money balance; adjust
passively to inflows and outflows of cash until they hit a lower bound, at
which point the balance isrestoredto a higher level. Akerlof and Milbourre
show thattheshort—run incomeelasticity of money demand in this model is
verysmall, so long as the target and threshhold stay fixed, and argue that
their model accounts for the very small short run income elasticities of
demand found in empirical studies.
The collapse of the empirical demand for money function in the U.S.
(6oldleld, 1976; Rasche, 1987) led to a largely empirical reexamination of the
basics of money demand. Most attention has been commanded by the work of4
Barnett and others (e.g. Barnett, Offenbacher and Spirtdt, 1954) creating
Divisia aggregated money stock measure;. The change in the Divisia quantity
ii;dex s equal to a weighted sum of the changes of the component;, with the
weights corresponding to the share of spending on that component of the
aggregate.In the case of monetary asset;, thespendingon a particular
component is priced at user cost, equal to the difference between themaximum
expected holding period yield available in the economy and the expected yield
on the particular asset——It thus corresponds closely to the notion of non—
pecuniary returns. The Divisia aggregates are contrasted with the simple sum
aggregates such as M, which weight components of each measure equally. The
empirical success of the new measures has been mixed. Monetary targetting in
terms of Divisia aggregates is complicated by the fact that the aggregates
themselves depend on interest rates, so that achieving a targetted Divisia
aggregate implies achieving a specific level of a non—linear function of
different asset stock; and interest rates. Poterba and Rotemberg (1987)
develop and estimate a more explicit related approach in which money and other
assets enter the utility function, with differing liquidity characteristics
and risk premia accounting for interest differentials.
Technical and regulatory changes and induced changes in definitions of
the money stock are responsible for many of the shifts in the demand for money
function (Porter, tlauskopf and Simpson, 1979). Nonetheless, these shifts have
significantly reduced belief in the efficacy of a constant growth rate
monetary rule and in monetarism.
Even though interest rate control; have been lifted, there is more
deregulation of the United States financial system to come, far instance ininterstate and international banking. Whether stability will return to the
dmardfor ncney furiction, foranyof theconventicinalmonetary acigregatesor
sonic Divisiaaggregate,as deregulation of the banking and financial systems
slow;, recriairis to be seer. Continued deregulation and technical progress in
the payments mechanism——heading in the direction of, but not reaching, the
cashlesssociety——arelikely to make for future unpredictable arid significant
changes in velocity.
In the 1976 survey thistopicwas devoted largely to the question of
the effect of an increase in money growth on capital intensity. Whereas Tobin
(1965) showed in a nor—mai ni i ng tnodelthat ahigher growth rate of money
produced both more inflation and higher capital intensity——and thus a lower
realinterest rate, money in Sidrauski's optimizing model (1967) is
superneutral in the sense that higher rates of inflation do not affect steady
state capital intensity and thus the real interest rate.
The effect of higher inflation in reducing the real interest rate is
known as the Mundell-Tobin effect. In fact, the mechanisms that produce this
effect in Mundell (1964) and Tobin (1965) are not identical.In Mundell, a
higher inflation rate reduces real balances and thereby, through a wealth
effect, consumption; the interest rate fall; to ensure goods market
equilibrium.In Tobin new money is introduced into the economy through
transfer payments, the net real value of which is (g—n)m, where g is the
growth rate ofnominalbalances, itheinflation rate, and m is real balances.
In the steady state (g—ii) is equal to the economys growth rate (assuming
unitary income elasticity of money demand) which is independent of the6
inlatiori rate, whereas m fall; with the ir4lation rte. The real valueof
monetary transfer; thus falls with the inflation rate, reducingconsumption
demandarid the realinterest rate.Back—of —the—envelope cal cul ati ens suggest
thatboth these effectsare empirically very small.
Subsequentanalysis showed that dynamic adjustment toward; the steady
state capital stock is typically faster in the Sidrauski model the higher the
growth rate of money, thus reinstating the Mundell—Tobin result in the
Sidrauski model, at least for the adjustment path (Fischer, 1979).A variety
of results on the relationship between capital intensity andinflation have
beenobtained in other model; of money, including for instance Stockman's
(1981) model witha Clower constraint in which investment good; have to be
paidfor with cash in advance. The cost of investing rise; with the inflation
rate, and inflation therefore reduce; capital intensity. However this result
is not robust to the precise details of the assumed Clower constraint (Abel,
1985). In overlapping generation; model; inflation generally reduces capital
intensity (e.g. Weiss, 1980).
The most important development in this area is the incorporation of
detail; of the tax system into the analysis of the effects of inflation on
interest rates and capital accumulation (e.g. Feldstein and Summer;, 1978).
Mainly because inflation erode; the value of depreciation allowance;, these
generally indicate that It reduce; capital intensity and capital accumulation.
Tax effect; also disturb the Fisher effect on nominal interest rate;, implying
thatthe nominal rate should rise more than one—for—one with inflation i the
after-tax real rate is to remain constant (FEldstein, i976).7
The empirical evidence supports the view that inflation adversely
affects capital accumulation; in a cross—section of countries, the predominant
relationship between inflation and the share of investment in GN' is regati ye
(Fischer,1983).
Empirical evidence on the Fisher effect has had an unusually checkered
history. After Fama's striking 197 demonstration that, on the assumptions of
a constant real interest rate and rational expectations, the Fisher effect
held one—for-one in the U.S. for the period 191—1973, it soon became clear
that the result was period specific (Begg, 1977). Further, the tax ef4ects
should have produced a greater than one—for—one effect of inflation on nominal
interest rates. Subsequently Summers (1952) showed that cx post decadal
average real interest rates have a strong negative correlation with inflation,
and argued that this implied that ex ante rates are also negatively related to
anticipated inflation.4
Changes in the real interest rate in the United States in the first
half of the 1980's were in the direction implied by Summers' regressions.
Indeed, it was common to account for the high real rates as a regular feature
of disinflations——which while true is hardly an explanation.The high real
rates of the early 19B0's made the assumption of a constant ex ante real rate
implausible if the rational expectations hypothesis is maintained.
4However McCallum (1984) has pointed out problems with the Summers
argument. See also the subsequent debate between Summers and licCallum in
the July 1986 Joal of MonetaryEconomics.
It is always possible and possibly plausible to account for high long
rates as consistent with unchanged real rates at the start of a
disinflation, but high short rates cannot be consistent with an unchanged
ex ante real rate,8
ar e Cost s o f InflatinptimumQuantity of Pt ony and In{lp
N nance.
By 1975the Phelps (1973) analysisofthe inflation tax in the context
ofoptimaltax analysis was becoming well known. Subsequent work was directed
to answeri rig the questi on of whether there were condi tion; under which the
inflationtax would not be used, so that the optimum quantity of money
result——thatthe nominalinterest rate should be driven to zero——would still
hold.Drazen (1979) showed, using a representative family infinite horizon
modelthat there was no generalpresumption that money shouldbe taxed, the
result dependingon cross—elasticities of demand between real balances and
other goods. Faig (1985) proved in the case where money ismodelled as an
intermediate good, that it wouldbeoptimal not to tax it. The question of
howoptimally to finance government spending among bonds, money issue arid
taxes received was analyzed by Helpman and Sadka (1979).
The topic of the welfare cost; of inflationreceivedempirical
attention. The conclusion of attempts to enumerateandquantify the costs of
inflation(Fischer and Modigliani, 1978 Fischer, 19B1) was that the costs of
evenmoderate inflation could in practice amount to oneor two percent of6NP
indeveloped economies, but that these cost; were largely the result of
institutionalnon—adaptation to inflation.
As inflations in several countries rose to three digit annual rates in
the 19BOs, monetary financing of budget deficits becamecentral to the
analysisof the inflationary process. Seigniorage revenue can amount to
several percent of6NP for governmentsoperating at high rates ofinflation,
andcould thus be an important factor in the perpetuation o4 high inflation in
countries with rudimentary tax systems.9
As a result of the Laffer curve, there may be two inflationrates at
whicha given amount of seigniorage revenue can be collected. The stability
propErtiesof the two equilibria differ, the high inflation equilibrium
typicallybeing stable under rational expectations.(Bruno arid Fischer, 1987;
Sargent and Wallace, 1987). Governments could then find themselves operating
at an unnecessarily high inflation rate.
Despite the fact that ;ei gnior agepersecanproducesi gni i cant
amounts of revenue for the government, the inflation tax analysis that focuses
on seigniorage may be seriously misleading. The eynes-Dlivera—Tanzi (1980)
effect whereby tax revenues decline at high inflation rates6 reduces thenet
revenue effect; of iriflati on on government revenues. Remarkably,in the
Israelicase there is evidence that on net inflation reduced government
revenues during parts of the inflationary period, because the government was a
net creditor on nominal terms and debtor on real terms (Sokoler, 1987).These
considerations strongly suggest that something other than rational revenue
considerations is driving the money—creation process in high inflation
economies; one possibility is that thegovernmentha; put in place a set of
operating rules that leaves money creation a; the residual source of
gover nmerit finance,7
Disequilibrium Theory.
In 1975 disequilibrium theory was a live area of research that had
alreadyproduced insights, particularly into the notion of effective demand,
'The effect is more likely a function of the change than the level of the
inflation rate, for once the inflation level stabilizes tax rates are
usually adjusted.
7Mmnkiw (1987) examines the determination of the inflation rate in the
United States from an optimal tax viewpoint.10
intothe fact thatbehaviorin any one market depends on whether other markets
clear, arid into the effect; of charges in the real wage on the macro
equilibiurm. The distinction between classical unemployment, resulting from
too high real wages, arid Keynesian unemployment, resulting from a lack of
aggregate demand, which can be clearly understood from standard disequilibrium
models, also proved useful, for example in empirical analyses of the European
unemployment problem (Bruno and Sach;, 1985).
Beyond those insights, and despitethe elegant statement of the
approachin Malinvaud (1976) and other contributions reviewed in Drazen
(1980), interest in disequilibrium theory ha; waned. The difficulty, already
evident in1975,wa that the careful maximi:ing analysis that underlay the
derivation of demand and supply functions at given prices was not extended to
price dynamics itself.If there is a successor to disequilibrium theory, it
is the new Keynesian analysis to be reviewed in Section IV, where price and
quantity determination are treated symmetrically.
Sen e r a lEgiHbriu m A p p roach toMDnetarTheory.
The "generalequilibrium" discussed under this heading in the 1976
surveywas the equilibrium of the assets markets, with attention focussed on
the Brainard—Tobin supply and demand framework for asset pricing and the
analysis of monetary policy.That approach has been integrated with the
capital asset pricing model, in an attempt to identify the effects of changes
in asset supplies on risk premia (e.g. B. Friedman, 19B5; Frankel, 1985).
The modern approach to asset pricing deploys various forms of the
capital asset pricing model, mainly derived through representative consumer
models (e.g. Lucas, 1978; Breeden, 1979; Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985).11
Asset supplies are exogenousin the Lucas inode1 it is difficult to obtain
closedform solutionsfor assetpricesin models in which supplies are
endogerous. The Lucasmodel ha; beenused for ;tudyi ng relative asset returns
(Campbell, 1986) and the size of the equity premium (Mehra and Prescott,
1985); Mehra and Prescott's result; raise the question of whether the
historical size of the equity premium can be rationalized in such models.
The term structure has continued as an active area of research,, with
the development of rational expectations econometrics making formal testing of
the joint hypothesis of the expectations theory of term structure and rational
expectations possible. The recent literature is surveyed by Shiller (1987)
whostates that there has been much progress in urderstandi ng the term
structure in the last twenty years, but that empirical work hasproduced very
littleconsensus.
The New Microfoundations of Money.
Covered under this heading was fundamental work attempting to explain
the need for and use of money (e.g. Brunner and Ileltzer, 1971; <urz, 1974;
Starr1 1974). Lucas (1980) and Townsend (1980) have pursued models inwhich
thelack of a double coincidence ofwants necessitates theuse of an asset for
makingexchanges, but by and large workon the reasons for the use of money
hasnot gonemuch further than it had in 1975. Rather the modern trend ha;
been to imposethe use of money on the model, rather than to allow it to
emergefrom within the model.
There are tw approaches: the Clower or cash—in—advance constraint;
and money in the utility function. The Clower constraint imposes the
requirement that money has to be used in making some or all transactions. The12
usual cash—in-advanceconstraintn discrete timemodel; isthat current
income is not available for making current purchases, so that money for this
period; purchaseshasto be held from the end of thepreviousperiod. By
imposing unitary velocity on money holding this rules out the important
systematic effects of inflation and interest rate; on money holding.
Lucas and Stokey (1987) restore interest elasticity to money holding
in a cast—in—advance constraint model by introducing a distinction between
credit and cash goods, the former of which can be purchased with an interest
free one period loan,thelatter requiring the use of cash.Shiftsindemand
betweencash and credit goods as their relative prices change then make it
possible for in4lation to producesystematic effects on velocity. However the
distinctionbetween cash and credit goods is unlikely to be independent of the
inflation rate and interest rates. Svensson (1985) relaxes the unitary
velocity assumption by assuming that individuals face uncertainty about their
spending and have to decide on money holdings before the uncertainty is
resolved.
The Clower constraint has also been imposed in general equilibrium
continuous time models (Jovanovic, 1982; Romer 1986) where lump sum
transaction; cots generate a demand for money, as in the original partial
equilibrium Baumol—Tobin models. There is a Clower constraint in the
innovative continuous time model of Diamond (1984), in which both multiple and
inefficient equilibria arise from the increase in the efficiency with which
sellers search for buyers whenthere are more buyers. The constraint ha; been
usedconstructively to explain asset pricing anomalies (Svensson, 1985;
Townsend, 1987) and price level determinacy with pegged nominal interest rates
(Woodford, 1985).13
The money in the utility orproductionfunction approach has the
benefit of greater generality in producing a demand for money.Indeoci as the
theory of revealed preference shows, specifying that a good enters the utility
or production function is merely the assumption that there is a demand for
that good. Restrictions on the demand function emerge from the functional
forn of the utility function and fromthe precise way inwhich money balances
are put into the utility function (Feenstra, 1986).
The longest section of the 1976 survey discusses the rational
expectations hypothesis and its applications in monetary models.isample
Phillips curve along Lucas (i973) lines, but more explicitly enphasiing
intertemporal substitution on both the supply and demand sides, is presented
and used both to illustrate the information assumptions needed to generate a
Phillips curve in an equilibrium model and the monetary policy ineffectiveness
theorem.
The 1976 survey draws a clear distinction between the rational
expectations hypothesis as a theory of expectations, and the type of
equilibrium model in which the hypothesis was typically embodied at the tse.
Rational expectations has indeed become the dominant expectations hypothesis
in nacroecoromics, despite the evidence by I(ahnemari and Tversky (1g83) of
systematic errors in expectations, and repeated failures of Joint tests of
rational expectations and subsidiary hypotheses. The rational expectations
hypothesis is the dominant paradigm because it is the natural benchmark model
ofexpectations and because thetechnology now exists to do rational
expectationseconometri cm.
eor, what is almost the same thing, because there is as yet no clear way
of choosing among alternative assumptions.14
osever,theneed to coupletheWEformof therationalexpect at ions
assuffption—-thatindividual; make the optimal use of the information available
to th i---withan explicit learning model is well reccgri:ed, Dc Canic (1979)
showedconvergence to rational expectations for a plausible learning process;
the topic has been the subject of considerable recent research, e.g. fray and
Savin (1986), Harcet and Sargent (1986), and will no doubt generate further
result; on condition; for convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium,
and the nature of the alternative equilibria.
The further difficulty of dealing with the rational expectations
assumption in a many-agent model in which each agent's expectations depend on
his beliefs about the expectations of others ha; been wrestled with by Frydman
and Phelps (1983). The problem of infinite regress can be cut through by
assuming each agent's expectations of actual outcomes is correct. However in
situation; such as the inception of an inflation stabilization program, the
process of learning about the new situation where there are other agents whose
actions depend on their beliefs is neither conceptually nor in practice
straihtfor ward.
The subsequenthistory of the Phillips curve component of the Lucas
model is discussed in the next section.
I I. MnyandEgi ii b r I sC y c 1 e T e ory.
TheLucas (1973) Phillipscurve model was thedominant equilibrium
model for almost a decade.The distinguishing featuresofthe model are that
Lucas (1972) is a morefullyspecifiedgeneralequilibrium modelthat
generatesa non—exploitable Phillips curve tradeoff.It is possible that
thi; model contains multiple equilibria.LI
it buildsthe Phillips curve on imperfect information, andthatthe exposition
though not necessarily the structure of the modalemphasizesa monetary cause
ofeconomic fluctuations.
Athird feature distinguishes themodel as a prototype equilibrium
modelsprices move instantly to clear markets which are fully competitive.By
contrast, Phillips (1958) rationalized his curve as an expression of the
response of wages to labor market disequilibrium.If the expectations of
individuals in the Lucas model were correct, the equilibrium would be a Pareto
optimum.More even than the assumption of equilibrium, it is the assumption
ofcompetition that distinguishes the equilibrium business cycle approach from
other analyses of economic fluctuations.1°
Lucas derived several important results in his 1973 paper. The first
is the Phillips curve—but result; there Is a tradeoff between output and
inflation, but the tradeoff is only with unanticipated inflation. This
implies the policy ineffectiveness results later developed by Sargent and
Wallace (1975), that monetary policy has no real effects in models of this
type. This was the main empirical implication of the model tested by later
researchers.
The third result is that the slope of the Phillips curve in the Lucas
modelconsists of a combination of a structural parameter, the elasticity of
supply in each market, and avariance ratio that isaffected by policy.Thus
anapparently structural parameter, the slope ofthe Phillips curve, would
change if policy changed in aparticular way.' Such possibilities are at the
soEquilibriumtheorists frequently rely on the result that a Pareto
optimum can be supported by a competitive equilibrium to analyse quantity
movements in representative agent models without having to examine price
behavior.
111n the 1973 article Lucas attempted to test this implication using
internatianal cross—sectional data.16
heart of Luca;s famous econometric policj evaluationcritique (1976),which
asserts that b,cau;e apparently structural parameter; may charge when policy
changes, ei;tirig econometric model; cannot be used to ;tudy alternative
policy regimes.
Thepolicyevaluation critique has had a devastating impact on both
econometric policy evaluation and the seriousness with which large scale
nacroeconometric models are treated by researchers, at least in the United
States.Into the mid—seventies, serious academic researchers were putting
major effort; into large—scale models state—of—the—art empirical versiori; of
major behavioral functions were as likely to be found in the MRS (MIT—Penn—
SSRC) model as anywhere.
Such model; are now routinely dismissed as 'subject to the Lucas
critique—-though remarkably, that critique has not been shown to be of any
empirical significance in accounting for the failures of the econometric
models in the seventies. Lucas himself (e.g. 1976) has repeatedly referred to
the massive empirical failure of these model; in including a long—run
inflation—unemployment tradeoff that was falsified in the seventie;.t But
that was a failure oftheory,which was repaired in the late sixties,
following work by Friedman and Phelps, by adding the expected inflation rate
to the Phillips curve. The 1973 supply shock also led to an underprediction
of inflation in the major models, but that has nothing to do with the Lucas
critique——unless the Lucas critique is reduced to the statement that models
are inevitably misspecified.
'2See also Lucas and Sargent (1978) who refer to "empirical failure on a
grand scale" and the evaluation of that claim by Blanchard (1988).47
Fromatheoretical viewpoint, the Lucas (1972 and 1973)model isof
interestiorits demonstrationof the information-conveying role of prices.
Lucas included two disturbances arid ore sourceof informati on about them"the
pricein the local market. Someofthe subsequent theoretical developments
elaborated on the information structure, for example byadding a capital
market. The basic result in models in which money would beneutral with full
informationis that itwillbe neutral (non—superneutrality, suchas the
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disturbancesin the economy; so long as monetary disturbances (which may come
from the demand as well as the supply of money) cannot be fully identified,
unanticipated changes in money will have realeffects.
Despitethe elegance and intellectual power oftheoriginal model,
subsequent intensive theoretical development, and some empirical successes,
the imperfect information about current monetary variables approach to the
monetary business cycle hasmetwith severe difficulties. The basic problem
is that It is difficult to believe that a lack of information about current
nominal variables, particularly the price level, can be the source of monetary
non—neutrality, when the lags in producing money stock and price level data
areof the order of weeks. Further, if those lags were important, they could
bereduced to seconds. It would be entirely possible to produce an on—line
estimate of the current price levelatlowcostby providing terminal; to
businesses, which would enter price changes as they took place. The failure
of the DPI futures market set up in the United States in 19B also sugqests
that short term aggregate price level uncertainty isnot a significant problem
inthe U.S. economy.Geyond this problem, enpiri calsupportfor themodel was riotrobust.
Despite early work by Barro (1978) indicating thatonlyunanticipated changes
in themoneystock affected output, later research by Gordon (1982) arid
Mishkin (19831 suggested that both anticipated and unanticipated money
mattered. Results by Boschen and Grossman(1982) showi rig thatoutput appeared
to be affected by the currently perceived money stock, and related conclusions
reached by Barro and Hercowitz (1980), coming as they did from proponentsof
theequilibrium approach, had a significant impact on supporters of the
approach.
TheLucas model was set up to model the Phillips curve, or the
apparent association between inflation and output. The non—neutrality of
money is a problem for monetary theory precisely because money is neutral in
most clearly specified models in which markets clear quickly.If sticky
prices are ruled out on methodological grounds, and the implausibility of the
information assumptions rule out the information—confusion assumption of the
1973 Lucas model, then it becomes difficult (this is an empirical statement)
to provide a convincing theoretical acccount of a causal Phillips curve
relationship.
Themost influential demonstration of the real effects of money on
output is no doubt Friedman and Schwart:'s (1963) account of the Great
Depression; their more systematic attempt to address this issue (1963a) by
working with cyclical average data and timing relationships was less
persuasive because of the evident variability of the timing relationships and
the question of causation.19
Confidencein a causal role ofmoneywas increased by Sims' (1972)
result in a two variable (nominal GNP and the money;toc)system that money
Granger-tauses output, and by the previously noted results on the e{fct of
unanticipated money on output. However, the disappearance of Oranger
causatior for money in a vector autoregression to which the nominal interest
rate was added (Sims,1980) raised doubts about the role ofmoney, even though
no clear explanation for the latter finding emergecI.1 Combined with the
theoretical difficulties, this 1980 result led toexploration ofthe
implication; of endogeneity of the money stock.
Honeymay be endogenous eitherbecause central barks pursue
accommodatingpolicies, or because most of the money stock is inside money,
the real volume of which adjusts to the level of economic activity. Tobin
(1970) showedina model of endogenous money that particular money supply
rulesmay generate the appearance that money Branger—causes (a concept that
was not yet used in economics) output even in a context where it has no
effects on real output (Tobin presented this result as an example of the post
hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy).
One approach to modellingtherole of inside money is to include
transactions services as a factor of production, and to assume that banks are
involved in the production of such services, using labor, capital, and perhaps
outside moneyas factors of production (King and Plosser, 1984).' In the
absence of outside money, it is difficulttosee why the price level or
138oth Rotemberg (1987) and Blanchard (1988) examine and extend the
evidence, concluding that it supports the view that monetary shocks affect
output.
4However there is no inherent reason that outside money is needed in such
a system.20
inflationrate a; opposed to real activity is procyclical in ;uch models.
Onceoutside moneyis introduced, the behavior of thepricelevel follows from
the interactions of the real demand for outside money and the nominal supply:
this approach ii ke that of Tcibin (1970) rd ics on central bank behavior to
determine the correlation between the price level, the money ;tock, and
out put
Withregard to money, the equilibrium approach appears to be squeezed
between the theoretical difficulty of finding a route through which monetary
policy can affect output and the fact that changes in aggregate demanddo
appear in practice to affect output. The real business cycle approach
sidestcpsthe money issue and attempts to account for the major
characteristics ofthe cycle in a purely non—monetary framework.
III. Bus inssCy.çj.
Foursets of stylized facts are the central focus of business cycle
analysis:
.There are fluctuations over time in both employment and unemployment,
correlated across industries, associated with only small changes in the real
wage, and apparently correlated with demand disturbances.
.These fluctuations, along with fluctuations in output, are serially
correlated, which is the essence of the business cycle.
.Cusiness cycle fluctuations appear to be correlated with monetary
disturbances: there is a Phillips curve. The two approaches to building
equilibrium models consistent with this fact have already been described.21
.Consumption, income, and employment are positively correlated overthe cycle.
Thework of Nelson and Ploscer (1982) and subsequent research byamong
others Rose (1986), Cochráre (1986), Campbell and Mankiw (1987), and Ciuah
(1987) has cast doubt on the conventional characterization of the cycle s
consisting of serially correlated divergences of output from a smooth trend.
Rather it is argued there is a unit root in the stochastic process for
output—-and that there is little dynamics other than that.If there were no
dynamics other than the unit root——that is if output followed a random walk,
then it would not be possible to talk of a business cycle in output. However,
Campbell arid Mankiw cannot reject the characterization of output as a second
order hump-shaped process around a deterministic trend. Further, Cochrane
(1986) finds some evidence that the dominant root is less than one.
More fundamentally, even if there were a unit root in output, the
business cycle could be defined as consisting of fluc:tuations of the
unemployment rate about a slowly moving trend. There is little evidence of a
unit root in unemployment, except perhaps for some European countries
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Thus the ei'tence of the business cycle does
not seem threatened by the finding of a unit root in thestochastic process
foroutput.
Business cycle theory was a major branch ofeconomicsuntil the
l(eynesian revolution. Early business cycle theorists saw the cycle as largely
self—sustaining, with each boom containing the seeds of the subsequent
recession and slump, the slump inturncontaining the seeds of the recovery
andboom. Thebusiness cyclecontinued to be a subject of research
1Haberler(1937) contains an authoritativeaccountof the earlier
approaches122
*Oiiing the ner revolution; Samuelson's (1939) multiplier—accelerator
model, Kaldor ';non—linearcycle (1940), and kic1c' non—linear node); (190)
re all firmly in the Keynesian tradition. The Keynesian revolution did shift
the focus of macroeconomics from the inevitability of the cycle to methods of
improving macroeconomic performance.
During the long expansion of the sixties, it was even po ible to
think that the business cycle had been cured.l& Poor economic performance
during the seventies, reflected in the increased frequency and depth of
recessions, together with the forceful advocacy of Robert Lucas (1977) renewed
interest in the business cycle as a specific field of research.}.Iut modern
approaches are not a continuation of the main line of earlier business cycle
analysis.
Rather ,moderntteori ;ts have followed the stochastic approach of
Frisch (1933) and Slutsky (1937), which distinguishes between the shocks that
impinge on the economy, causing variable; to differ from their steady state
values, and the propagation mechanisms that convert the shocks into longer
lived divergences from steady state values.1 The modern approach is
especially convenient for econometric implementation. Further—-and this was
the basic point of Frisch and Slutsky——the time series behavior of economic
variables produced when shocks disturb relatively simple linear difference
equation systems is broadly consistent with business cycle characteristics.
delman and Adelman in 199 showed that the Klein—Goldberger econometric model
No doubt economic fluctuations will always be with us; the cycle would
be cured if deviations from full employment output were small and serially
u n correlated.
7Zarnowitz (1985) compares earlier and later approaches, not always to
the benefit of the latter, which he suggests has become excessively
fragmented.23
the fprerunner of the Wharton model) generated output movements similar to
thoseobserved inthe U. S. busires cycleheri subjected to tochaEtic
disturbances.
Shocks may hit the economy on the demand side, for instancea
stochasticchange in private sector or government demand for goods, perhaps
resulting from a change in fiscal or monetary policy. Or they can come from
the supply side, as productivity shocks, or shifts in the supply functions of
factors of production. The shocks, for instance productivity shocks, may be
serially correlated.
A variety of propagation mechanisms can carry the effects of the
shocksforward through time:
.Becauseindividuals prefer smooth consumption streams, temporarily high
output today generates high saving, thus high investment, and a larger capital
stockand higher output tomorrow.
.Lags in the investment process may mean that increased investment demand
today increases investment demand and output in future periods as well.
.Firms carry inventories in part to meet unexpected changes in demand. A
demand shocktodaywill cause firms both to draw down inventories and increase
production,arid in future periods they will increase productiontorestore
inventories.Thus production willbeserially correlated.
.Individuals may work harder when wages are temporarily higher——the
intertemporal substitution of leisure——and thus both magnify the effects of
productivity shocks on current output and tend to produce negative serial
correlation of labor input.24
.Because it is costly for firms to adjust their labor forces, firmstendto
adjust thelaborforce gradually in response to changes in wages and prices.
.Because individuals may take time to understand the nature of the shocks
hitting them (in particular whether they are permanent or transitory) their
responses to shocks may be distributed over time.
.Because it takes time for individuals to search for and find jobs, shacks to
demand and supply lead to prolonged labor force adjustments.
Both the shocksand the propagati or; mechanisms identified in the
precedingparagraphs can be embodied in either market clearing or non—market
clearing cycle models. Proponents of the g_L__çjLt
.p_proach?are distinguished by their view that virtually all business cycle
phenomenaare the result of productivity shocks hitting an economy in which
markets are continuously in equilibrium.
In general, though, real business cycle theorists do not examine
markets explicitly, rather drawing on the equivalence of market and planning
solutions to deduce the behavior a-F quantities that would be seen if resources
were allocated optimally. They typically also work with representative agent
models.In the remainder of this section I concentrate on the real business
cycle approach, best exemplified in the paper by Kydlard and Prescott (1982).
Serial correlation of output in an equilibrium model car; be generated
most simply by assuming that productivity disturbances are serially
correlated——as they undoubtedly are.A priori it seems reasonable to posit
1Capital accumulation, inventory dynamics and slow adjustment of factors
of production were all components of the MPS model.
198ee for example the case made by Prescott (1986) Summers (1986a)
attacks Prescott'sclaims for the approach. Fischer Black (1982) was an
early proponent.4.
thatproductivity shocks are a mixture of permanent changes that come from
I mproveme-nt s in knowledge° and transi torychangessuch as those that cce
fromthe weather.If factor inputs were constant, any pattern of output
correlation could be derived purely by specifying the stochastic process for
productivity. Kydland and Prescott do assume productivity is serially
correlated, though there is no indication in the description of their results
how much the different shocks and propagation mechanisms in their model each
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aboutproductivity is a satisfactory basis for explaining cyclical and trend
behavior depends on whether independent evidence can be 4ound for the assumed
formulation (McCallum, 1986)). Research attempting to identify supply and
demand disturbances (Shapiro (1987) and Blanchard and Quah (1987)) is
currently under way.
I now briefly discuss propagation mechanisms it will turn out that
the key issue is that of the intertemporal substitution of leisure, without
which shifts in aggregate demand have no impact on output and supply shocks
have noimpacton labor input.
The Ro 1 e of C a p ital.
It is straightforward to obtain a stochastic first order difference
equation for output from an overlapping generations model of two—period lived
people who supply work inelastically in the first period of life and save by
20By definition, the stock of genuine knowledge must always be increasing,
apparently implying that technical knowledge as represented by the
production function should have only positive increments. However,
mistakes may be made in choosing technologies to use.In the field of
economics, monetarists would argue there was technical regress when the
Keynesian revoluation was adopted, Keynesians would argue there was
technical regress when monetarism temporarily triumphed in the seventies.26
buying capital that is used up in retirement. positive productivity shock
in the current period raises output and the income of the employed, therefore
saving,and therefore future capital stocks. Thisproduces positive serial
correlationof output, through the supply side.
However the supply of capital route to serial correlation cannot be
empirically significant.Suppose thata shock raises GNP this year by IY. and
thatsaving increases by as much as O./. of GWP, With the real return on
capital equal to aboutIOV.,the extra saving would increase output by O.O5 in
the following year, implying very little persistence of the effects of the
productivityshock.
LongandPlosser(1983) develop a simple multi—sector capital nodel.
With an n—sector input—output structure, and a one—period production lag
between inputs and outputs,the system has n roots andis therefore capable of
interestingdynamic behavior when disturbed by productivity shocks. This
modeltoowillnotgenerate high serialcorrelationof output unless the share
ofcapitalin output ishigh.
Nonetheless, ithas long been observed that booms in economic activity
are typically accompaniedby investment booms;the multiplier—accelerator
mechanismhas for long beenpart ofmost account; of thecycle. Kydland arid
Prescott (1982) emphasize "time to build"——investment projects require inputs
in several earlier periods before they come into operation. However it is not
clearfrom their exposition how muchoftheir dynamics results from the time
tobuild assumption.
Inventories.27
itis well known (see for example Dornbusch—Fischer (1987), Chapter 9)
that inventory decumulation accounts for a significant proportion of the
declineinreal 6NP in periods following cyclical peaks.In every post1948
U.S. business cycle except one (198O-Bl), a large part of the decline in
demand during the recession consisted of a decline in inventory accumulation.
The intuitive explanation for the role of inventories is that a
decline in demand causes an inventory build—up, perhaps slowly if producers do
not notice the demand shift immediately, and that production is then cut back
to work off the excess inventories. In a model with a multiplier, this
cutback in production itself reduces demand further, accentuating the decline
in output.
Inventory accumulation is usually motivated in equilibrium models by
production smoothing. Increasing marginal costs of production imply that it
is cheaper to meet shifts in demand by changes in production that are
distributed over several periods than by increasing production solely in the
period of the demand shift.21 A shDck to demand causes an increase in
consumption In the current period, which is met in part by increased
production and in part by drawing down inventories. Then in subsequent
periods production stays high as inventories are restored to their target
level. In the case of cost shocks, a temporary cost reduction should lead to
an increase in output and buildup of inventories, followed by lower output
that allows inventories to return to their target level.
The insight goes back at least to Holt, tiodigliani, tiuth, and Simon
(t97). Blinder and Fischer (.1981) embed production—smoothing based
inventory behavior in an equilibrium model.28
In the real business cycle approach, which eniphasies productivity
shocks, inventories tend to create negative serial correlation of output. A
favorable temporary productivity shock results in higher output today, pMrt.ly
for consumption and also to build up inventories. Then in future periods
output is lower than normal as the inventories are consumed, creating the
possibility of negative serial correlation of output.
Although inventory dynamics is not helpful in explaining positive
serial correlation in real business cycle theory, I briefly review recent
work. The production smoothing model implies that if shocks are to dmard,
output is smoother than consumption if shocks are to supply, output is more
variable than consuffiption. Several researchers have found that the
variability of production exceeds that of sales or consumption2? implying
either that the production smoothing model is inappropriate or that cost
shocks play a larger role in explaining inventory behavior than most
researchers are willing to allow.
At least two other models have been proposed to account for the
cyclical behavior of inventories. One builds on production lags (Abel, iB;
Kahn, 1986).2 Suppose that the sales process takes at least one period, and
that goods have to be in place at the beginning of any period in which they
are to be sold, and that demand is serially correlated. Then high sales this
period imply that inventories have to be restored, and that production has
also to increase to meet higher than average demand next period.
22See for example Blinder (1984) and West (1985).
2Although the Kahn and Abel models are related, Abel examined conditions
under which production smoothing still took place, whereas Kahn was
looking for conditions that explain the 'excess" volatility of
inventories.29
A second appr ch, initiated by Blinder (1981), and followed by Caplini
(198) arid Mosser (1986), explores the implications of modelsinwhich
invertorypolicyiss—S. Thepolicyis to order inventories only whenthe
inventory level hits a trigger point, s, and then to order an amount that
restores the inventory level to S.
If the average order size (S—s) is large relative to sales, then this
ordering policy, which is frequently used in practice, creates the possibility
that production can vary more than sales. Whether it does, depends
significantly on the cost function of ultimate suppliers. If the supplier has
constant costs of production, the s—S policy may well lead to more variable
output. Alternatively, suppose demand for the final good were relatively
constant, and that the s—S orders come in quite regularly to theproducing
firm. With concave production costs the producing firm would produce smoothly
to meet expected orders, and the s—S policy would determine only where
inventories were held——by producer or by seller——rather than the production
pattern (Caplir, 198).
Intertemporal Labor Supply Substitution.
Both capital accumulation and inventory dynamics undoubtedly play a
rolein business cycle dynamics, andboth illustrate that entirely
neoclassicaleconomies in whichmarkets are always in equilibrium cart be
expected to produce serially correlated movements in output around trend. But
none of the models we have developed so far accounts explicitly for the first
stylized fact set out above, the pro—cyclical pattern of hours of labor.
If shocks are assumed not to come from the labor supply function
itself, then the cyclical pattern of labor supply inanequilibrium model is30
determinedbythecycli cal behavior of the real wage. The question of whether
the real wage is pro—orcountercyclical has been the subject of research for
at least a half—century, since Keynes assumed in the _hoythat4irms
were always on their demand function for labor.24
Geary andKerinan(1982) test and are unable to reject the hypothesis
that therealwage and employment are independent across a sample of twelve
industrial countries. They show that results on the cyclical properties of
the real wage depend on. whether the CPI or WPI is used to define the real
wage. However the wei ght of theevidence by nowis that the real wage is
slightlyprocyclical. Schor (198) finds evidence ofpro—cyclicalwagesin
nine industriali:ed countries for the period 1955—70, with lessprocyclicality
in the subsequent decade. Basing his argument on overtime premia, Bus (1986)
also finds significantly procyclical real wages.We shallinthefollowing
discussionassume that the real wage is mildly procyclical, but that it would
require large elasticities of labor supply for these real wage movements to be
interpreted as movements over the cycle along a simple labor supply curve.
There have been three approaches to explaining the cyclical behavior
of the real wage. One is to argue that the labor market is not in
-
equilibrium,that, for instance, there is always excess supply of labor, and
that the business cycle is driven by shifts in aggregate demand. The pattern
of the real wage then depends on assumptions about pricing.In the ?rJ_
Theoryand early Keynesian models, in which firms were assumed to be always on
a stable demand function for labor, the real wage would be counter—cyclical if
241t is well known that Dunlop (1938) showed the real wage was procyclical
in Fact. Tarshis (1939) is often credited with supporting Durilops
results, though as noted by Blanchard (1987) in fact he showed a negative
correlation between changes in manhours and changes in real wages.aggregate demand disturbances are the predominant cause of the cycle. In
mark—up pricing model;, in which the price is a mark—up on the wage, the ri
wage may be independent of the state of the cycle.
The second argues that observed real wage; have very little to do with
the allocation of labor26. The wage is set either to provide insurance to
worker;, or a; part of a long—term bargain between the firm and the worker
and need not vary with employment. Nonetheless, because it is efficient to do
so, work at all times is pushed to the point where the marginal product of
labor is equal to the marginal utility of leisure.
Proponents of equilibrium business cycles have however largely pursued
a third route, the intertemporal substitution (of leisure)__ap_pgach. The
approach, which can be traced to an influential 1969 paper by Lucas and
Rapping, argues that labor supply responds extremely sensitively to transitory
incipient changes in the real wage, and that this high elasticity reduce;
movements in the real wage. Whatever movements there might be in the real
wage could easily be obscured by small disturbances to the supply of labor
functi on.
Consider a person who consumes and works in two periods. The utility
function is:
1+p
U(c1,c2,x1,x)In c —(l+)_txi +
(I+$)—tCInC2— Y(1+)tx2 1 (1)
2When in the 1970'; supply disturbances made their entry into standard
macroeconomic models, it became clear that the cyclical pattern of the
real wage depends on the predominant source of disturbances.
26This is implied by Azariadis (1975)anddeveloped in Hall and Lilien
(1979).32
wherec is consumption, and x± is labor; f3 ) 0. The greater is f3 the greater
is the curvature of the di sutility of labor function and the less wil)in are
individuals to substitute labor (and thus leisure) intertemporally. The
individual maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint
+ c2/Rw1x1 +w2x2/R (2)
whereRis one plus the interest rate.
Solving the resultant first order conditions, the ratio of labor
inputs in the two periods is
1/p
xIx Cw1I(w(1+6)IR)3 (3)
The ratio of labor inputs is determined by the relative wages in the two
periods Wiandw2/R, with an elasticity 11)3 that depends on the curvature of
the disutility of labor function, and which for psmall(in which case the
marginal disutility of labor is virtually constant) may be extremely large.
Thus depending on the utility 4unction a small increase in the wage in one
period relative to the wage in the other may cause the individual to work much
more in that period relative to the amount of work done in the other period.
When w1 and W2changein the same proportion, (3) showsthat there is
riochange in the ratio of work done in the two periods.It can also be shown
that a proportional increase in wages in the two periods leaves total hours of
work in each period unchanged as the income and substitution effects of the
change in the wage just balance each other. That is, individuals may respond
sensitively to transitory changes in the real wage, while responding not at
all to permanent changes.33
This result is theessenceof the intertemporal substitution
explaration of tie behavior of hours of work over the cycle: that indivi duals
respondsensitively to the small pro—cyclical variations that car sometimes be
detected in the real wage. Such variations couldforinstance be caused by
productivityshocks.Hence if the cycle were driven largely by productivity
or supply shocks, andifintertemporal substitution wore to be established as
a major force in determining hours of work, the basic puzzle of large
movements in the quantity of labor could be solved in an equilibrium
framework.
The empirical evidence on the i ntertemporal substitution hypothesis is
mixed,though mainly unfavorable. Work by sltonJi (1982) and Ashenfelter
(1984) finds little evidence to support strong intertemporal substitution
effects in labor supply. Hecknan and Macurdy (1987) suggest that the evidence
is still in its infancy, and that it is not inconsistent with equilibrium
models that admit considerable worker heterogeneity.
Consumption andLeisure_ov__Cycl€jEven if the inter—temporal leisure
substitution explanation of the cyclical behavior of real wages and employment
is accepted, the final stylized fact——the negative covariance of consumption
of goods and consumption of leisure——has to be accounted 4cr. More work is
done in booms than in recessions; there is also more consumption (or at least
purchases of consumption goods) in booms.
2714ote that the real interest rate plays a role in determining the
intertemporal allocation of labor: a procyclical pattern cf the real
interest rate could therefore account for cyclical changes in the quantity
of labor that occur despite constant real wages.34
Thestandard utility function usedto study intertempora] allocation
problemsis additively separable (over time). 4ssuming both consumption and
leisureare normal, Barro and King (1984) show that such functions have the
verystrongimplication that both consumption and leisure should move in the
same direction in response to all disturbances except those that change the
termsof trade between consumption and leisure within a given period, that is
therealwage.Without real wage movements the cyclical pattern of
consumptionand leisure cannot be explained by the standard form of utility
function.But since real wage changes are, if at all, only mildly procylical,
the additively separable formulation cannot be a good one——if one insists on
an equilibrium interpretation of the business cycle.
tiankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) Examine the Euler equations
derived from the standard interternporal optimization problem based on a
particular additively separable utility function. Using aggregate time series
data they find no support for the intertemporal substitution model. The
essential problem is the cyclical pattern of leisure and consumption, for they
typically find that one or the other is inferior.
Equilibrium business cycle proponents have suggested two alternatives
to the standard formulation. The first, due to Kydland and Prescott (1982),
allows for habit formation or fatigue in the utility function, by replacing
the leisure argument in the utility function by a distributed lag on leisure.
The second formulation builds on the fact that most variation in hours
takes the form of changes in numbers employed rather than hours per employee.
Staying within the representative agent framework, Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1985) have built models in which individuals work either zero hours or full
time (say forty hours).35
Solving the central planning problem in such aneconomy, Hansen shows
thatwage' or consumptionvariability over timedoes riot depend on the
propertiesofthe underlying utility of leisure function. rther , the
cyclical pattern of the wage reflects the properties of the marginal utility
ofconsumptionfunctionandnot the marginal utility of leisure function-"-
because hours ofwork are notset to equate the marginal utility of leisure2
to the real wage.
Whatis the market setup corresponding to this central planning
problem? It is that everyone owns a share of the firm or firms in the
economy, and receives the same share of profits in addition, every potential
worker signs a contract with a firm, which guarantees a given utility level in
exchange for the individual 's willingness to work a specified number of hours
if his or her number is drawn.If there is disutility to work, then each
worker will receive a payment for signing, and an additional payment if he or
she works.
It is not clear what should be regarded as the wage in this setting.
If it is the marginal product of labor, then that may not change over the
cycle——for irstanceifthe utility function is separable, and there is the
appearance of large changes in output with no change in the wage.
Alternatively, if everyone who signs a contract with the firm receives a
payment, and there is an additional payment for those who work, that marginal
payment may be regarded as the wage——and it could be constant over the cycle.
It is also possible though that the wage is measured as the per capita payment
B1{theutility function is separable between leisure and consumption,
then the marginal utility of leisure at 40 hours of work per week is
constant.36
(averaged over employed and unemployed) received from the firm by each worker,
which increases with the aqgregate amount of work done in this model. Further,
if the marginal utility of consumption were decreasing, the average payment
per worker would be even more pro—cyclical. In this case the Harisen—Rogerson
construction also implies a pro—cyclical real wage.
Two issues are relevant in judging the potential value of the
Rogerson—Hansen amendment to the standard equilibrium model. First, it is
necessary to detail the factors determining the length of theworkweek, and
the possibilities of part—time and overtime work.It is clear that there Is
some fixed cost of taking a Job and thus that the approach starts from a
useful fact; it is also clear that the workweek in fact varies over the cycle,
and that part—time work has become increasingly common, Second, the
implication of full private insurance against unemployment and the fact that
the unemployed are in no way worse off than the employed are both
unsatisfactory, the first because there is very little private unemployment
insurance, the second because it violates everyday observation. Whether by
invoking moral hazard and non—homogeneities of the labor force it becomes
possible to explain the absence of such private insurance ir an equilibrium
model remains to be seer.
The more important lesson of a model ofthistype may be that the
representative agent assumption is unsatisfactory, and that labor force
heterogeneity may play an important role in determining the cyclical pattern
of wages. Suppose that for technological reasons individuals can work either
full time or not at all. Suppose also that workers differ. Then variations
in employment take place at the extensive margin where new individuals enter37
employmentor leave it, rather than at the intensive margin of hour; of work.
Thenthe responsiveness of hour; of work to change;in the real wagehave
nothing to do with individual utility function;, but rather with the
di ;tr i but on of reservation wages of those rear the employment mar gin.
Variation in numbers employed across the cycle is reflected also in
the pattern of unemployment. Very little in the equilibrium business cycle
framework addresses the issue of unemploymert.° Indeed,ithas been common
in this approach to work with the 1CVCI of output a; the key macroeconomic
variable, and to treat unemployment as a secondaryandnot very interesting
iss u e •
Even iftheunemployment issueis left aside,the equilibriumapproach
tothe business cycle runs into its greatest problem in the labor market.
Real wages simply do not show the movements that are needed for this theory to
explain the facts, and it is unclear that the assumption of indivisible labor
solve; the problem. What then could explain the fact;? We have already noted
that theories that do not require labor market equilibrium may do the Job.
Alternatively, the reported real wage may not accurately reflect the
marginal product of labor and marginal disutility of work. For instance,
imperfect capital markets may result in firms paying workers a constant real
wage over the cycle, with the allocation of labor nonetheless sensitively
reflecting shift; in the productivity of labor and marginal valuation of time.
7This point is emphasized by Heckean (1984) and Heckman and Macurdy
(1987).
Ham(1986) argues that the unemployed cannot be interpreted as being on
their labor supply function; in any useful sense.
51This tradition goes back at least to Friedmans Presidential Address
(1968). For an examination of the issue of involuntary unemployment, see
Lucas (1978a).38
Labor adjustment costs.
The real wagemay difler fromthemarginalproductof labor it the
shortrunwhenthereare costs of adjusting inputs.2 Labor adjustment costs
reducethe responseof hours of work to the real wage: the firm changesits
labor input in response to a transitory shock to productivity or the wage, by
1ess than it wouldwithout costs of adjustment. in response to a permanent
shockto the wage or productivity, the firm eventually adjusts all the way,
setting the nargi nal product equal to the wage. But the adjustment tak
ti me.
With respect to cyclical adjustments to real wage movements, this
modelhas exactly the opposite implications to the intertemporal substitution
model.Costs of adjustment therefore do not help account for the cyclical
pattern of real wages and employment.35
Search une m p 1 oy
Unemploymentis modelled in an equilibrium framework as resulting from
search, where the search is not only that of unemployed workers looking for
jobsbut aio that of vacancies looking for workers. Mortensen (1970)
develops a search—theoretic unemployment model and derivesan explicit
expressionfor the natural rate ofunemployment as a function of the
determinantsof rates of job loss and acceptance. Lucas and Prescott (1974)
present a complete model of the unemployment process generated by stochastic
S'tlodels with labor adjustment costs have been studied by Solow (1965) and
Sargent(1978)
33Pr)extended version of the adjustment cost model is often used in
explaining the cyclical pattern of labor productivity.In that version
not only are there costs of adjusting the input of labor, but also the
existing labor force may work harder at times of high demand, or may be
used in times of slack on maintenance and other investment-like tasks.39
shift;in demand among sector; and a one—period lag by worlers in moving
between sectors. More recently Diamond (1981, 1982) and Pissarides(198)
have developed arid worked withsophisti cated cort 1iUOLI5time search model;.
Howitt(1987) is a particularly tractible search model, embodying adjustment
costsfor labor,arid generating dynamic adjustment of employment and
unemployment to productivity and demand shocks.
One theme o4 modern search theories of unemployment is that because
job matches require an explicit search process, there is no market to set the
wage.(Mortensen, 1982) Rather it is assumed that the wage is set in a
bargain which divides the surplus from the job between the worker and the
firm.
Typicallyequilibrium is inefficient in these models, reflecting a
search externality which arises because a worker's decision to search makes it
easier for a firm to fill its vacancy——but there is no direct compensation
from the hiring firm to the searching worker for his or her decision to become
unemployed.The inefficiency may make a case for unemployment compensation.
Inthe opposite direction, the congestion externality created for the
unemployedby the decision of a worker to join their ranks could suggest a tax
onunemployment.
Lilien (1982) argued that most of the variance of unemployment in the
United States in the period 198—1977 was a result of relative rather than
aggregate shocks to the economy, which set off shifts of workers between
sectors and thereby affected the aggregate unemployment rate. Abraham and
Katz (1986) and Murphy and Topel (1987) question this interpretation of the
34Sargent(1987) presents several search theoretic models, mostlyfrom the
sideof the worker or consumer.40
data: the former because differing supply and demand elasticities in any event
imply di erences rtsectoralresponses to aggregate shocks, and be ause the
behavior of vacancies is inconsistent with the relative disturbance
hypothesis; the latter because rising unemployment is in fact a ocited with
a decline in the mobility of labor between sectors.
More direct evidence on the role of search in unemployment comesfrom
surveysshowing that the time of the unemployed is mostly spent waiting. The
notionthatindividuals can search more efficiently when they are unemployed,
and therefore optimally enter unemployment to seek new Jobs has little
empirical support.They could as well be working at MacDonalds. The theory
of search unemploymentmightthus be replaced by a theory of optimal wait
unemployment3 which would presumably stress the influence of aggregate demand
on the creation of job opportunities.
I V. The New-KjnesiantVALL £ciiitinQ W ittjpr.
Evaluating the contribution of the GeneraL Thegy_, Keynes remarked
that the disappearance of the notion of aggregate demand for almost a century
was anextraordinary episode in the history of economic thought (Patirikin,
198G).Much of the sophisticated development of the microeconomic foundations
of macroeconomics in the 1950s, such as the permanent income—life cycle
theory of consumption, inventory and portfolio theories of the demand for
money, and flexible accelerator theories of investment3 elaborated or the
determinants of demand.41
There have been significantdevelopmentsin theempiricalmodelHriq of
aggregate demand since 1975, though no real departures from earlier
theoretical approaches. Thelifecycle—permanent income consumption function
remains the mainstay of consumption theory, with new testing methods having
developed following the key contribution of Hall (1978). Hall tested the
implications of the Euler equation or first order condition for intertemporal
consumer optimization, which under specified conditions implies that
consumption huId follow a random walk.It is not yet clear whether
consumptionis excessively variable orexcessively smooth, the issue turning
onwhether detrended income follows a stationary process or not. Empirical
work on liqui dity constraints and other causesofpotential deviations from
thepermanent income hypothesis has turned to cross—sectional data (e.g.
Zeldes,1985). Tobins Qtheory of investment has received much attention and
iswidely used, though empirical results relating investment to stock prices
are still far from satisfactory (Summers, 1981).
The last decade has seen real progress in the theory of aggregate
supply on Keynesian lines. The Phillips curve was exactly the empirical
construction the Keynesian model needed to model the supply side, endogenizing
thedynamics of the wage rate and the price level. But the theory of aggregate
supplyunderlying the Phillips curve remained underdeveloped. Although
Phillips (1958) and Lipsey (1960) both explained the Phillips curve as an
application of the law of supply and demand, the law itself lacked
microfoundations. Arrow (1959),discussingprice setting, argued that the
assumption of competition made explicit study of price—determination
difficult.
For a review of the issue;, see Hall (1988).42
The Frman—Phtlpsaddition of theexpected rate ofinflation to the
Phillipscurvebothstimulated further work on the microfouridations cf price
setting,and tendedto focus thereasonsfor the real effects of shiftsin
demandonoutputon errors in expectations. By 1970, Phelps arid Winter were
able to announce in the landmark Phelps volume that a 'landing on the non—
Wairasiancontinent has been made". The papers in the Phelps volume were
mainly earc.h theoretic, and implied that anticipated changes in prices would
have no effects on output. The radical implications of thatresultdid rot
become clear until Lucas(1972,1973) combined theFriedman—PhelpsPhillips
curve with the asriumption of rational expectations.
The cciritributions of Fischer (1977) and Taylor (19B0)37 clarified the
distinction between the implications of rational expectations and of wage or
price stickiness in accounting for real effects of money and aggregate demand
on output.In each case sticky nominal wages determined in long—term labor
contracts were the source of nominal inertia. Each model implied a potential
stabilizing role for monetary or aggregate demand policy even in the presence
of rational expectations, and provided a framework for examining thedynamic
effects of changes in policy on prices and output.
8Nordhaus (1972) worked on the microfoundations of the Phillips curve,
showing that there was no necessary inconsistency between markup pricing
and competition.
7Phelps and Taylor (1977) also showed that nominal disturbances could
produce real effects in a rational expectations setting with sticky
prices.
For simplicity adjustment in both models is built entirely or the
dynamics of wages and prices.In practice, other propagation mechanisms,
such as inventory adjustment arid others described in Section II above,
affect the dynamic adjustment of the economy to demand and supply shocks.43
Contractualwace setting allows forpotentiallyinteresting price and
outputdynamics in reaponse to disturbances to supply or demand. Particularly
intheTaylor mode), where workers are concerned over relative wages andwges
are held at a constant level throughout each contract, wage leapfrogging can
produce protracted adjustments3. Because the dynamics depends siqnifcantly
on whether contracts are staggered or co-ordinated, there has been extensive
investi gation of the determinants of the staggering structure4'. Eince rel
world contracts are co—ordinated in some countries (e.g. Japan) and staggered
in others, it is likely that both structures may be stable, depending onthe
predominantsources of disturbances to the economy (Fethke and F'olicano,
19B6). Theefficiency of different staggering structures ha also been
investigated(e.g. Ball, 1986).
Although the contract wage setting approach has been fruitfu] ,ittoo
lacks microfoundations. In particular, as pointed out by Barro (1977), it
leaves open the question of why quantities are determined by demand.4' tiore
generally, the fundamental question posed by any non—equilibrium approach to
fluctuationsin which wages or prices are sticky is why, if fluctuations are
economically costly, private agents do not make arrangements that avoid such
costs.42Thenoti on that there must be some market failure, an externality or
39Calvo(1983)develops a very tractable contract model.
40These are reviewed in Blanchard (1988).
4tFischer used the irrLJheoryassumption that firms are always on the
demandcurve forlabor,while Taylor assumed markup pricing and the
aggregate demand determination ofoutput.
42Lucas(1987) hasargued that thecostsof aggregate fluctuations, as
measuredby the variance ofconsumption,are small. He asserts that in
thepost—WorldWar II period, elimination ofallvariability ofaggregate
consumptionaround trend would have raised utility, in a representative
agent model, by the same amount as an increase in the level ofconsumption
of one—tenth of one per cent. McCallum (1986) questions this estimate on
the grounds that it assumes the trend is independent of stabilization
policy.44
coordination failure, is an old one that has not untii recently received
satisfactory formal treatment, despite the suggestive analysis by Okuri(1981).
When sticky wages are responsible for unemployment, the obvious
question is HWhydon'tthe unemployed bid down wages?" Keynes argued that
wage flexibility would not in any case help maintain full employment, because
of adverse effects of expected deflation on demand and employment. More
recently, de Long and Summers (1986) have re—examined this argument, finding
for someparametervalues in the Taylor overlapping contractsmodel that wage
flexibility is indeed destabilizing.4
Solow (1980) forcefully addressed the question of wage stickiness,
arguing that several causes each tend to create sticky wages nd/or prices, and
that the stickiness is a key fact in understanding business cycle
fluctuations. We examine theoretical developments of three of the causes of
wage stickiness that he discussed: long—term labor contracts44, the role of
unions, and efficiency wages. In reviewing these topics, we should note the
distinction between nominal and real rigidity of wages and prices: whereas the
Fischer and Taylor models build on sticky nominal wages or prices, in order to
develop models in which monetary policy has real effects, some of the work to
be reviewed produces real but not nominal price stickiness.
Labor contracts;Baily(1974) showed that for any pattern of employment, an
individual without access to the capital markets would prefer more stable to
less stable income. zariadis (1975) examined optimal labor contracts between
4Taylor (1986) claimed on the basis of an emprical analysis comparing
the periods 1891—1914 and post—World War II that greater stickiness of
wages and prices in the United States in the latter period increased the
amplitude offluctuationsgiven the disturbances affecting the economy.
44This is a much and well surveyed field. See zariadis (1979), Hart
(1983), Rosen (1985), Stiglitz (1986), Hart and Holmstrom (1986),45
risk averse workers without access to income insurance markets, and risk
neutral firms.,findingthat therealwage intheoptim1 contract was s.tit.e-
independent,withthefirm essentially smoothing the individuals consumption
stream bypayinga constant realwage. Aariadis assumed thatworkersworked
eitherfull time or not at all, and that firms made payments only to the
einpleyed, the urenpi eyed receiving unemployment compensationor some other
sourceof income.
The Bail y—A:ar i adi s result seemed to provide a reason for stickiness
of real wages and variability of real outputs with real wages sticky rather
than increasing with output, perhaps increases in demand would call forth a
greaterIncrease in output than in competitive markets. However, it turnsout
thatwith constant marginal utility of income, output in the 4:ariadis model
would be the same in each state of nature as in a competitive labor market.4
Further, if payments could be madetothe unemployed, employed and unemployed
workers in the Azariadis model would receive the same income and the employed
would envy the unemployed.
Insight into the output results in the Azariadis model was provided by
Hall and Lilieri (1979), following an earlier contribution cf Leontief (194)
in any bargaining situationbetween workers and a firm, the employment
contractshould in each state of nature satisfy the efficiency condition that
the margi nal value product of labor be equal to the margi nal disutility of
work. The terms of compensation can then be set separately, and do not
necessarily imply that the wageis equaltothemarginalvalue product of
labor in each state.
45Jfworkersutility functions are such as to produce an upward sloping
labor supply curve, employment varies more with labor contracts thanin a
competitivemarket.46
The mid—seventies approach, which built labor contracts around
di f{erer;ce; in risk—aver sion and access to capital markets, does not iccount
for the fact that firms st employment decisions. The later asymmetric
information approach assume; that the firm knows the state of nature but the
worker does not.4 Thefirm and the employees agree on an optimal contract
thatspeci 11 eswage—employment conbi nati on; in each state ofnature.8ecause
of the asymmetric information,contracts have to satisfy an incentive
compatibilityconstraint whereby the firm doe; not have an incentive to
misrepresent the state.
Thesecontracts do imply that thefirm sets the employment level.In
generalthey do not satisfy the expostefficiency condition, and thus can
account for departures from Wairasian quantity levels. However, it also turns
out thatunless firmsare more risk averse than workers, optimal asymmetric
information contracts generally imply more employment in bad states of natures
thanwould occur in a competitive non—contract labor market. This——together
withthedifficulty of deriving results-—has led to some discouragement over
the contract route to explaining economic fluctuations.47 Nonetheless, the
fact that asymmetric information——which certainly exists——makes for
inefficient employment levels, is itself an important result.
UnionsThe labor contracting approach to wage and output determination
assumes that there is free entry into the labor pool attached to each firm,
Whenworkers are unionized, the union may control access tothe firm's labor
force,and may have its own utility 4unction.4
4Seethesurveys noted above; Hart and Holmstrom provide a concise
summary.
Grossmn, Hart and Maskin (1983) have embedded asymmetric information
labor contracts in a general equilibrium model andshown that shocks that
change the variance of a variable relevant to firms' employment decisions
mayaffectthe aggregate level of employment.
4EForsurveys on unions, seeFarber (19B6), Oswald (1966) and Pencavel
(1986).47
McDonald and Scilow (1981) showed that in contracts between a union
(with given membership) and a firm, and given certain assumptions on the
determinants of the bargaining outcome,the behavior of the real wage ever the
cycle is determined by the cyclical behavior of thewage elasticity of demand
forlabor. Thus with a constant elasticity of labor demand, the rel wage
would be invariant over the cycle, so long a; not allmembers of the union
were employed. This is another potential reason for real wage stickiness.
However, as noted by McDonald and Below, their model is partial
equilibrium anddeals with wage and quantitydetermination in a single period.
Unemploymentoccurs within theperiod when the demand for labor islow. But
the average level of unemployment in a succession of one—period models
realizations would depend on the dynamics of the reservation wage.If unions
are to produce a higher average rate of unemployment than would occur in
competitive markets, they have somehow to maintain a higher reservation wage
than the competitive wage.
If unions succeed in obtaining high wages that cause unemployment in
the short run, the dynamics of employment depends on whether it is possible
for a non—unionized ;cctor to develop. The existence of a pool of unemployed
workers provide; the opportunity for new firms to undercut existing firms by
employing the current unemployed at wages below union rates. If this process
works slowly, the presence of unions may account for slow adjustment of
unemployment towards the natural rate.If unions rigorously control entry,
they may be responsible for permanently higher unemployment..
There has been much interest, particularly in Europe, in using union
models or related insider—outsider model; to explain per;istent high48
unemployment(Lindbeck andSnower,1984). Unions may be able to affect the
averagelevel of ureiploymert if they controlentry into the workforce.The
keyissuethen is what is the union utility function. For instance, if unions
areconcerned only with the interests of their current membership, they may
totally ignore the unemployed1 and can produce long—term unemployment
(Blanchard and Summers1 1986),
Tti policy implications of insider—outsider models are not
unambiguous. Presumably they justify open shop legislation and other steps to
break union control over entry into the work{orce; alternately, Layard (19B6>
argues for subsidi:ation of the unemployed outsiders to allow them to break
iii
E+ficency_WgesTheefficiency wage hypothesis is that the wage affects
workerproductivity.49 In underdeveloped countries1 low wages mayimpair
strength and concentration and raising the wage may reduce the unit cost of
the effective labor input.
There are several rationales for the efficiency wage hypothesiseven
wherephysical strength is not an issue. The simplest is the sociological
explanation, that firms that pay higher wages generate a more loyal and
therefore more productive wrk force. In the shirking model (e.g. Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984) firms can only imperfectly monitor worker performance.
Workers who are caught shirking can be punished only by being fired, in which
case they receive the alternative wage. By paying wages above the alternative
rate, firms provide an incentive to workers not to shirk. One criticism of
this model is that shirking can also be prevented by alternative mechanisms,
such as the posting by workers of performance bonds.
49Katz (1986) presents an excellent survey and empirical examination of
the efficiency wage hypothesis.49
Theshi rkir;gmodEl provides an e>planation fordual labor markets, in
which higher wages are paid for primary jobs than for second.ry (in which
shirbrg is difficult) perhaps even for workers withthe sane abihty.
Whether the shirking model generates unemployment depends on how large the
secondary market is relative to the primary; certainly it is possible to
generate wait unemployment in a dual labor market if workers are willing to
workatthe primary butnotthesecondarywage (Hall, 1975).
The implications of efficiency wage theories for macroeconomic
fluctuations depend on their ratioriale.1 Solow (1979) showed that the wage
may be constant (at the unit labor cost minimizing level) in an efficiency
wageeodel ,In underdeveloped econcimi es this would peg the rel wge at
level determined by physical efficiency. In the shirking model, the
efficiency wage would be set as a differential above the secondary wage.It
would not then prDvide a justification for sticky real or nominal wages
without further explanation for the stickiness of the secondary wage, or some
explanation of why the primary wage itself was sticky.In both these case;,
itis, if arythi ng , thereal wage rather than thenomi ralwage that would be
sticky.
Sociologicaltheories that build on the adverse effects of wage cuts
on morale could account for either nominal or real wage stickiness. Casual
observation certainly supports the notion that wage cutting has aradverse
effect on morale, but the deep reasons for that are unclear. Conceivably this
is a self—justifying convention. Alternatively, relative wages may affect
5Iat: (1986) discusses also turnover, adverse selection, and union threat
effiency wage models.
1Start (1984) builds an almost—textbook style keynesian model withan
efficiency wage as the only departure from a classical model.morale', and wage stickiness may result fromthedifficulty of co-ordinatirg
wage cuts across decentralized firms
Summa!1: With onepossibleexception, contract theory, unionwage models, nd
efficiencywage theories account for real rather than noninal wage rigidity.
The possible exception is the nominal wage version of the argument that wage
cutting reduces worker morale——but this hypothesisamounts to littlemorethan
restatingthe puz:le of the apparent inflexibility of wages.4
Theunionand efficiency wage models may also help account for
unemployinent'. To the extent that they produce both unemployment and rigid
real wages, they also account for the fact that cyclical changes in the rato
of employment are accompanied by only small changes in the real wage,
StickyPrices.
The Keynesian tradition and the Phillips curve emphasize nominal wage
stickiness. Strictly interpreted, the aggregate supply theories outlined
above account for real wage stickiness. Coordination problems-—the ct that
given other wages and prices, any change in a wage is a change in both the
real and relative wage——could perhaps generate nominal wage stickiness out cf
realwage stickiness. However, coordination problems fail to explain why all
2Certainlyobservation of the economics profession suggests a keen
interest in relative wages, and sometimes discontent over relative wage
reductions that are also absolute wage increases.
This is the General Theory argument that the aggregate wage level may be
sticky because workers concerned with their relative wages resist cuts in
their own wages which, given other wages, would imply a reduced relative
wage.
54Nominal wage cuts in the early eighties in the United States certainly
establish that nominal wages are not completely inflexible downward, but
those cuts nonetheless appear to have been regarded as excepti onal rather
thanthe establishment of a new norm.
Bulow and Summers (1986) press the case for theefficiency wage as an
explanationof unemployment and other ailments.wages are not routinely indexed. The conclusion is either that the original
enphasi s on nominal wage sti ckiriess was misplaced, or that nomini]wage
stickiness still awaits an explanation. The preoccupation with nominal wage
rigidity could be misleading though, a reflection of hysteresis in the
development of macroeconomic models, for rigid real wages are also a real
world problem with important macroeconomic consequences (e.g Iruno and Sach,
1985).
tiore recently the emphasis has shifted from sticky wages to sticky
prices. The new approaches generally start from a now widely—used model of
imperfect competition inthegoods markets that builds on the work of Dixit
and Stiqlitz (1977) .Thatimperfect competition is widespread is suggested
both by observation and by the work of Hall (1986) on markups in U.s.
industry.
Imperfect competition_gL_LLLbriurjTheGeneralTheor and the
monopolistic or imperfect competition revolutions occurred simultaneously.
The notion that there should be close connections between them Is an old one,
but the connection has only recently been made explicit. The intuitive reason
there may be a link is that the (eynesian assumption that suppliers are always
willing to sell more if demand at the existing price increases is a
characteristic of a monopolistic equilibrium. The reason to doubt the link,
at least in the case of nominal disturbances, is that monopolistic equilibrium
determines a set of relative prices, which will surely be invariant to nominal
shocks.
'See also Hart (1982) and Weitzman (1982).I draw here on Blanchard and
Fischer (1988, Chapter 7), which in turn is based on Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (19B7).52
Thefollowing general equilibrium model monopolistic competitioncan
be used to make both points. There are n producer—consumErs, each consuming
all goods butproducingonly one, with the following utility functions:
(1—v
(1) U (C /1)C (t'h /P) / C 1— ) ) —Cd/b)Y 1 > >0; d>0; p1
(1 / (i-e)) ($1 ) / (0/ (0-1)
where C n (E C
(1—0) (1/ (1—0))
and P ((1/n) E
Utility depends positively on consumption, C and on real money
balances t11/P, and negatively on the output of good i, Y. The production of
good i uses labor; the labor input enters the utility function in the form
shown either because production is subject to diminishing returns or because
labor is subject to increasing marginal disutility. The consumption of all
goods enters the utility function symmetrically.
The utility function implies a constant elasticity of substitution
between goods, equal to 0.Constant terms in the utility function are
introduced for convenience. Feal money balances enter the utility function,
and play a key role in transmitting effects of money stock disturbances to
demand.
Eachindividual faces the budget constraint
(2)E PC + M = PY 4 M
where 1. is intial holdings of nominal balances.
7Ball and Rorner (1987) derive the same results using a Clower constraint.Work ng from the firstorder conditi ens o4 the consumer,ard maki rig
somesubstitutions, the demand curvefacing each producer can be shown to be
(3) (Ps/P)(/(1—)n) (MIP) (F'.IP) (tl'IP)
where unsubocripted variables represent aggregates.
Producer i sets price to maxinie utility, taking theactions of other
producers (their prices) as given. This implies the relative price:
p—I(1 / ( 1@ (p—i))
(4) P IF'E ((d/ (E—1 I I (P1 IF') 3
Solong as thereareincreasing marginal costs of production
(p ) 1), an increase in (t'l'/P) results in both a higher relative price and
higher output. With constant costs of production an increase in (M'/P) would
result in no change in the relative price, and an increase in output.
Finally, recognizing the symmetry, all relative prices are equal to
one, which implies from (4) the equilibrium value of the aggregate price level
F',andthelevelofoutput of each producer:
(1/(1-p))
P1'
(1 / (p—I)I
Notefirst that in equilibrium the quantity theory holds: the nominal
price level is proportional to the money stock.It is also true thoughthat
ifP1' were to increase, and producers for some reason were to keep their
nominal prices constant, the utility of each would increase. This is because
price exceeds marginal cost. That is the source of an aggregate demandexternality: if prices are fully flexible, each producer raises price when the
moneystock rises, and all producers actingtogetherthereby reduce aggregate
demand andwelfare.
TePAYMinsiahtThederivativeof the profit {unctonof aprice setting
firm with respect t price is zero at the optimum. Thusdivergencesof price
from the optimum produce only second order reductions of profits. Parkin
(1986), Akerlof andYellen(1985) and Mankiw (1985> observed that, combined
with even small costs of changing prices, thisimpliesthat changes indemand
may lead monopolistically competitive firms not to change price and instead to
satisfy demand.°
Thus shifts in aggregate demand may lead to changes inoutput.
Further, the increase in demand may make everyone better off, in a first order
way, because of the excess of price over marginal cost in the initial
situation.
More precisely, the PAYM insight is that if all firms are at their
optimal price, and there are some fixed costs of changing price, a
sufficiently small increase in aggregate demand will lead to a welfare-
increasing expansion of output.
Cost; of price change are often described as menucosts,implying a
physical cost of resetting a price.It is difficult to think of many goods
for which such costs could be non—trivial. There may be a fixed decision cost
to the firm of reconsidering the price it charges for a particular good. Dr
there may be a loss of goodwill for firms that change price. Okun (1981)
argued that the goodwill cost is incurred by firms that change prices in
-Rotemberg (1987) named this the F'AYM insight.55
responseto demand shocks, but not by firms whose price rises merely pass cost
rasts or to customers..
Theass.uupti on in these casess that thereis a fixed cost to
changing price.Rotemberg (1982) investigates the effects on price and output
dynamics of quadratic costs. of price change. Whereas. withfixedcosts of
changing price, a large enough shift in demand will produce small effects on
output because most firms will adjust price, with quadratic costs of price
change, larger shifts in demand cause larger changes in output.
More careful examination of the PYM insight raises. several other
interesting issues. First, theremaybe multiple equilibria. In response to
a given shift in demand, both no change in price by any firm and full response
in price by all firms may be Nash equilibria (Rotemberg, 1987; Ball and Romer,
19B7).In this sense, Ball and Romer argue that sticky prices may represent a
coordination failure.9 Second, there is the question of why firms would find
it more costly to adjust price than quantity. Changing production plans too
appears to involve decision costs. One possibility for a large firm selling
tosophisticatedbuyers inthatwhereastheproduction decision is internal
and has to be made daily, the price decision ha to be communicated to a large
group of actual and potential buyers, and is thus more costly.
Third, there isthequestion of the effects of aggregate demand shifts
onoutput and prices when not all firmsareat their optimum price atanyone
time.Caplin and Spulber (1986) show that if firms are uniformly distributed
over the interval in which prices are set, and if the firms follow s—S pricing
policies60, then the distribution is maintained even afterdemandchanges, and
See alsoCooperand John (1985) on coordination failures.
'°Barro (1972) introduced s—S pricing rules for a monopolist. Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977) show that if the aggregate price level is increasing at a
constant rate, and if there are fixed costs ofchangingprice, then it is
optimal for firmstouse an s—S pricing policy in which relative price is
allowed to drop to a level s before being adjusted upwards to level S.
See Rotemberg. (1987)for discussionof optimal pricing policy.the averageprice leve] charges smoothly in response to demand changes.This.
appears todestroy the effects of the PAYtI insightthat produces Keynesian
results in the monopolistic competition model. owever, the Cap1in-pulber
resultis not robust either to the effects of discrete shock changes in the
money stock (Rotemberg, 1967), or to the possibility that prices. mayfallas
well as rise (Dlanchard, 1988).
It is not yet known what form optimal pricing behavior takes when the
aggregate price level is not growing steadily. An interesting result has been
obtained by Tsiddon (1986), who examines. the adjustment to an unexpected
change in the aggregate inflation rate. When the inflation rate falls, the s—
S range falls. This means that at the moment of the change, a number of fl nis
find themselves below the new optimal s, and should therefore raise price to
the new S. Some firms will be above the new 8; they however may find it
optimal to let their excessively high price be eroded by inflation rather than
adjust it. The implication is that a reduction in the growth rate of money
may initially lead to an increase in the price level.
Blanchard (1988) draws the distinction between
state dependent pricing rules, such as the s—S rule, and tine—dependent rule;,
in which prices are reset at particular time;. The extent of time dependency
varies across firms, for example between firms that print catalogs and those
that sell perishables. Further, even for firms that usually set prices at
particular times, large shocks may well disturb the regular pattern.'
£lTime dependent wage setting appears to be relatively more widespread
than time—dependent price setting.57
Nonetheless,it is interesting to e:plore the inplicatiorts c1 tinip-
dependency of price setting. key issue for dynamics in this case, as in the
case of wage setting, is whetherpricesetting is staggered cr synchronized.
Olanchard(1903) has used a stage of processing model to show how even short
lag; inadjustingprices canproducelong aggregate lags if price setting is
staggered.
ilSO as in thecaseof wage setting, the question of the stability of
the staggering structure arises.If an increase in the aggregate price level
increase; the desired price of a given firm, price staggering is unlikely to
be stable. For instance, where prices are fixed for two period;, if more than
half the prices re adjusted in evenperiod;,those whadjustprice in odd
periods have an incentive to move their adjustment to the even period—-because
the price rise that they observe after the first period causes them to want to
raise price. Of course, price adjustments are not synchronized in practice
thestaggering may to someextent be due to seasonality and thenon—
synchronization to the idiosyncratic shocks hitting the firm (Ball andRomer,
1986).
Itis notobvious in the monopolistic
competitionmodeloutlined above whyworker/firm; are willing tosupplymore
outputwhen demand increases.In that model, increase; in labor input are
calledforthby increases intherealwage, withlarger implying greater
sensitivity of the real wage to output.
Ifwere close to one,outputwouldchange withoutmuch change inthe
realwage. But if wereclosetoone,equilibriumbusinesscycletheory
wouldhave no difficulty accounting forthe observedreal wage—employmentrelationship. New Iseynesianc have taken two alternative routes in explaining
the cyclical behavior of therealwageinmonopolistic competition models.
$larichard and Kiyotaki (1987) model each worker as a monopolistilIy
competitive seller of labor.Attheiroptimum quantity of labor sold, worktrs
suffer little change in utility from working slightly more or less. That
couldexplain the cyclical real—wage employment relationship if all variations
in labor input were in hours, butisless persuasive whena considerablepart
oc the variation takes the form of unemployment of the worker.
A1:erlof and'(ellen(1985) instead assume monopolistic competition in
thegoods markets and an efficiency wage model in the labor markets. The real
wage is heldccristart atthe effi ci ant level ,aridvari ati otisin demand 1cr
goodsare translated into shifts inoutputat the same real wage.
V. _e lop mants.
Inthis section I brieflyreview recent developments in areasthat
have not sofar been discussed.
Nult ip 1 _ljija.
Thereare now crariy rational expectations models with multiple
equilibria.There isnothingexceptional in the result that changes in
expectations affect the equilibrium of the economy; the interesting feature is
that those changed expectations (animal spirits) may be correct and thus self—
iu;tilying. This is a rigorous Justification of the notion thatoptimism
itselfmay be sufficient to create a boom, or that all we have to fear is fear
itself.
62Rotemberg (1987) categorizes and concisely reviews these models, which
include contributions by A:ariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), Diamond
and Fudenberg (1962) and Shlcifer (1986),59
Rotemberg(19B7) review; the varieties of multiple rquilitriik and
their implications. Among the striking results are those by Kehoc and Levine
(198), showing an extreme multiplicity of equilibcia in overlapping
generations models; by Grandmont (1985) showing that deterministic cycles of
virtually any order can—-under some restrictions on utility functions-be
generated as rational expectations equilibria in an overlapping geriertions
model with money a; the only asset; and by Robert; (1986) producing a
multiplicity of unemployment equilibria at talrasian prices.
Policy analysis appears difficult when it is not clear at which
equilibrium the model will start, nor to which equilibrium a policy change or
other shocks will move it. One possibility is that multiple equilibria
enhance the role of policy, because the government may be able to provide some
focus for expectations about which is the relevant equilibrium (for instance
the full employment equilibrium). An alternative view is that models with
multiple equilibria are incomplete, awaiting the improved specification that
will remove the multiplicities.
Credit Rationing.
The recent concentration on the aggregate supply question 0why
output varies with only small variations in real wages has supplanted a
similar earlier question, of how monetary policy affects real activity when
interest rate movements are relatively small.In part the earlier question
has been obscured because interest rate movements——both nominal and real—-have
become much larger in the 1970's and 1980's than in earlier decades; in
addition, doubts have arisen about the effects of monetary policy on real
output, as the rise of the real business cycle approach testifies.60
Participantsri credit markets believe that credit is rationed, inthe
sense thatindividuals or firms cannottypically borrow as muchas they want
to at the going interest rate. Credit rationing was part of the transmission
mechanism for monetary policy in the MIT—Penn—SSRC model; with sticky interest
rates, monetary policy affects the availabilityofbank credit arid thus the
volume of investmentwithout necessarilyaffecting interest rates.
Creditrationing iscertainly understandable wheninterest rates are
controlled, say by usury ceilings. But credit is likely to be rationed even
without interest rate controls, for at least two reasons arising from
incomplete information under uncertainty.4 First is adverse selection: as
interest rates rise, banks are likely to attract riskier borrowers. The
second is moral hazard: as interest rates rise, borrowers tend to undertake
more risky project5.In each case an increase in the interest rate may reduce
the banks expected return; the bank therefore rations credit.In his
innovativethesis, Keeton (1979) demonstrates these two effects. He also
draws a distinction between Type I and Type 11 rationing: the former applies
when each indivi dual receives less than the amount he or she would wart at the
going interestrate; the latter when among identical individuals some are
rationedand someare not.
6:llen (1987) provides a comprehensive survey of the credit rationing
literature. Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) review their earlier
contributions arid criticisms of them.
64The case for the importance of credit market phenomena, arising from
imperfect information, in accounting for economic fluctuations andthe
apparent role of money in them has been made most vigorously by
Greenwald andStiglitz(1987).61
Althoughc.redi t reti On ng pr oduce; theappearance of nor cler I
markets,it does notnecessarilyimply an inefficientallocationof rurces
(EngHsh, 1986). Along similar lines, Yotsuuka (1987)shows thateven with
creditrationing, Ricardian equivalence may hold.
Thesense that credit rationing is an i mportarst component of the
monetary mechanism was reinforced by the findings of Friedman (1983) that the
debt—GNP ratio was among the most stable of macro ratios, HoweVer, in an
example of Goodhart or Murphy's Law, the debt—6NP ratiobegantodiverge from
previousbehavi or shortly after the Federal Reserve started arnounci rigtar gets
forthe growth rate of debt.
Bernanke (1983), re—examining the Great Depression, argues that the
increased cost of financial intermediation was largely responsible for the
collapseof investment, Beyond the effects of credit on demand, Blinder
(1985)claims that credit rationing affects aggregate supply. This is a
variant on the familiar Keyserlirsg—Patman—Cavallo—and—many—others argument
that higher interest rates are inflationary because they increase costs, A
sophisticatedgeneral equilibrium model of credit rationing and its impact on
themacroeconomy ha been developed by Bernanke and Gertler(1987), who start
fromasymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and show that firms'
balance sheets matter, and that in some circumstances government bailouts of
weak firms may be appropriate.
Bankin.
Fana (1980) and Fischer Black (1975) re—examined the theory of the
banking firm, providing anabstract view of itsrole, as portfolio manager and
operatorofthe accounting system. By and large this so—called new view of62
bnHrighadrio implicationsfor themonetirymechanism beyond those already
clear from Patinkin (196).
The common literarynotion that bankruns may be self—justifying
prophecies was confirmed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who alsodiscussedhow
deposit insurance could he a self—denying prophecy. King (1983) assessed
theoreticalissues that have to be faced in analyzing thenineteenthcentury
questionof whether a competitive banking system with freeentry would be
viable——anissue that the banking deregulation movement makes more than
academic.
Shiller(1979) inaugurated aprotracted and fierce debate over the
issue of excess volatility of the stock market. The simple—minded observer
watching the U.S. stock market rise by a factor of almost threebetween 1982
and1987 asks whether anything objectivecould possibly account for that
increase, or whether somebubbleor other irrationality might he
responsible
•
Itwas Shiller's considerable achievement to propose a way of
answering that question because a rational stock price isthepresent
discounted value of dividends, the variance of stock prices should be related
to characteristics of the joint stochastic processes for dividends and the
discount factor. Shiller assumed the discount factor constants and argued
that stock prices fluctuated excessively. The Shiller tests were rapidly
applied to thetermstructure of interest arid exchange rates with asset
pricestypically being found to fluctuate excessively.
65Jacklin(1986) describes andextends subsequentdevelopments.
'6This sentence appearsintheSeptember 1987 first draft ofthispaper.63
Thesubsequent debate seemed to pit fice conomlsts against
matroecoriomi st; ,withthe advantage hi {ti rig overtine to fi Tianco.'' The
issue is the stationarity of the dividend process; most recent work tends to
find that the stock market does rot necessarily fluctuate excesively (see for
example t(leidon (1986) and Marsh and Merton (1986)), though anomalies remain
in stock price behavior.
At the sane time as the empirical literature on excess volatility
developed, so did a theoretical literature on the possibility of bubbles in
asset prices. bubble is a self—justifying departure of the stochastic
process for an asset price from its fundamentals, and is another example of
multiple equilibria. At a given rate of return1 r, on an asset, the expected
value of the bubble component of price has to grow at rate r. The first
bubbles were deterministic: but a bubble could typically not be expected to
grow at rate r if the economy was efficient, because it would eventually come
to dominate the economy. Blanchard (1979) produced partial equflibrium
examples of stochastic or bursting bubbles which would be expected to grow at
rate rbut would almostsurelyhaveburst by some point.In general
equilibrium,Tirole (1985) has shownthatbubblescan exist only in
inefficient equilibria in whichthe growthrate exceeds the interest rate, and
that bubbles tend to be welfare—increasing.
Rcardi an Equivalence and Fiscal Pol i
'7Thjs sentence too was written before October 1987; it remains to be
seen how Black Monday will affect both the statistical and the polemical
debates.64
Barro(1974) inaugurated another protracted debate,thisoneover the
questionof whether individual; treat government bonds as net wealth.
Patinkin (196, p289) had discussed the implication; of the issue for the
neutrality of money and the effects of open market operations on interest
rate;.It seemed clear that if thedebt floated bythe government is to be
paidoffby future generations, then the future taxes implied by current debt
would riot4fstthe asset value of the debt. Barros contribution was to
show that finite lived individuals concerned about the welfare of their
descendent; might nonetheless behave as effectively infinitely lived, and thus
take into account the taxes to be levied on future generations.
although theissue was posed as 'i; the debt wealth", the answeris
also key to the questions of whether in fully neoclassical models fiscal
policyaffects realinterest rates, whether federal budget deficits affect
national saving and the trade account, whether open market operations are
neutral, whether social security affects the capital stock, and so forth.
Bernheim (1987) present; an account of the analytic arid empirical
literature it is clear that there are many reasons that Ricardian equivalence
could fail to hold, ard it is also clear that the evidence at this stage is
insufficient to change the prior views of most economists by very much.
Poterba and Summers (1987) argue that the concentration on finite hori:ons is
misleading, in that typically most of the debt will be paid off by those
currently alive, The U.S. fiscal policy experiment of the early 1980';
should, one might hope, have settledthe issue once—for—all: the major change
in the deficit raised real interest rates and did not increase private saving.
However that is only one episode, and its influence in regressions appears
insufficient to reject Ricardian equivalence (Evans, 1987).Barqent and Wallace; (1B1) startling claim that aonctary{inancinq
ofa government budget deficit could produce a higher inflat.ion rate than
monetaryfinancing increased the awareness of the intertemporal implication;
ofthe government budget constraint. The argument is that ifthe deficit will
ultmately be financed by money printing, thenthe mccuiul at ion of int crest on
thedebt will require higher seigriorage revenue jr the future—-which would
imply a higher steady state inflation rate with bond financing, arid could even
imply higher inflation now. The subsequent debate clarified not only the
reasonably general conditions under which the result holds, but also the
relationship between budget deficits and inflation (Drazcn and Helpman, 1986),
whichdepends on the policies that are expected to be used to reduce the
deficit to a sustainable level.
Index ati on.
In 1974 Milton Friedman returned from Brazil convinced that indeatior
would protect the real economy from monetary disturbances and thereby reduce
the cost; of inflation. Bray (1976) and Fischer (1977) confirmed that
indexationindeed neutralized the effect; of monetary shocks on
variables;indexatiori inthe capital market; iould also neutrali:ethe effect;
of nominal shocks. But indeation might amplify the real effect; of real
shocks to the economy.
Given the clear result; on indexation and nominal shock;, the minimal
adoptionof indexation in private contract; remains difficult to explain.
Evidentlythere are major advantages tonominal contracting thatare not
capturedbyexisting models.One possibility is that nominal shock; account
for only a small part of the uncertainty about the outcomes o contracts,66
which, together with small costs of adding complexity to contract;, prevent;
index ation.
The experience of accelerating inflation in heavily indexed economies
such as Brazil and Israel ha; been a chastening experience for proponents of
indexation.The fact that high inflation reflects problems in policy making
was not taken sufficiently into account; if as a result of indexation the
real effects of inflation are reduced, the result may be an increase in the
rate of inflation to achieve similar real effects.
Weitzman'; much-discus;ed proposal that workers take part of their
compensation as a share of profits bears some similarity to indexing of the
wage to profits, at the firm level. Weitzan (e.g. 1986) argue; that firms
are more willing to hire labor in a profit—sharing scheme, which would enhance
macroeconomic stability. The extent to which superior Japanese unemployment
experience reflect; their bonus system is a key issue in evaluating profit-
sharing. There has been intensive examination of the issue in Britain, where
incentives for profit—sharing have been provided in the budget.
The TheorLf Growth.
Pi{terrapid development inthe 4fties arid sixties, the theories of
economicgrowth and capital received relatively little attention for almost
two decades, despite the absolutely central importance of growth to economic
performance. The Ramsey—Solow and Samuelson's overlapping generations models
became workhorses ofmicro—basedmacroeconomics, but the theory of growth a;
Blanch4lower and Oswald (1986), who present evidence that profit—
sharing has been widely used in Britain, and Estrin, Grout and Wadwhani
(1987) take a sceptical view o4 the stabilizing and other beneficial
effects of profit—sharing.67
such was neglected. The worldwide growth slowdown made it inevitable that
interest in growth would revive, though neither theory nor intensiveempirical
workhas yet provided a persuasive explanation for the slowdown. Recent work
has emphasized the role of economiesof scale inthe growth process (e.g.
Romer, 1987).
The Theory_of Policy.
The rational expectations revolution in macroeconomic; and game theory
have combined to produce a far more sophisticated approach to the analysis of
pal icy than was state—of—the—art a decade ago. A key paper here is Kydland
andPrescott (1977), which introduced the problem of dynamic inconsistency of
optimal policy and argued that the dynamic inconsistency arising irom
discretionary policy—making could be prevented by adopting policy rules.
Developing the game theory approach, Prescott (1978) dismIssed the use of
optimal control theory for the design of optimal policy on the grounds that
economic agent; do not respond mechanistically to changes in policy rules.
The game theoretic approach to policy makes if possible to model
notions such as reputation and credibility that have long been staples of
policymakers'own discussions of their actions.? The predictive content of
theseapplications, as opposed to their usefulness in providing insights,
remains to be developed. Barro and Gordon (1983) showed that discretionary
monetary policy—making could produce an inflationary bias, but subsequent
developments that allow for reputational effects have weakened that result;
nor is it clear how to test it.
69This large and rapidly growing literature receives little space here
because it has been surveyed at length by, among others, Fischer (1986)
and Rogoff (1987).68
VI Concluding_Comment.
Any comparison of the contents of this survey with that of Barro arid
Fischer (1976)must conclude that there has been a tremendous increase in the
breadthand depth of macroeconomics in the past decade. Technical progress
fromthe side of both theory and econometrics has made It possible to address
and illuminate issues that were simply too difficult before——such as the
excess volatility of asset prices, the macroeconomic implications of
monopolistic competition, coordination problems in the macroeconomy, bank
runs, and the existence of multiple equilibria, to pickjust a few examples.
There is no question that macroeconomics is far more microeconomics
based than it used to be.In a sense the microeconomic foundations of macro
now exist,in equilibrium models ofthe Prescott—Kydland type inthe
equilibriumapproach, and in models such as the Akerlof—Yellen model in the
post—Keynesian approach. But to a considerable extent the earlier notion that
once the microeconomic foundations had been laid, a set of standard macro
modelscould be used, has not been justified. Rather the tendency has been to
build a variety ofmicro—based models, each making or emphasizing a specific
point.
Athree equation macromodel ,consisting ofthe IS—LM apparatus plus an
aggregate supply equation is frequently used.In the simplest version the IS—
LMside is reduced to the quantity equation or a Clower constraint, and a
Lucas aggregate supply equation, or one in which exogenous productivity shocks
drive output, is added.In the more Keynesian versions, velocity becomes a69
function of the nterest r ate, arid there is more detail on the demand side.
Interms of this model,therehas been advance in testing of the aggregate
demand side (e.g. Hall(197B) on consumption)but notto the same extent in
understanding of the structural determinantsof demand; there has been real
progress in analysis of the financial markets, though not necessarily in
understandingof the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; ard there is
greater understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the supply side.
Has macroeconomics progressed? Yes; there has been remarkable
progress in understanding many theoretical issues, some specified above, that
were only imprecisely understood before. There has also been progress in
understanding thestructureof thebasicmacro model.
Andyet: there isgreater not less confusion at the business end of
macroeconomics,in understanding the actual causes of macroeconomic
fluctuations,and in applyingmacroeconomics to policy-making. Revealing
untruthsis of course progress, and it is possible that the greater
uncertainty that now exists is part of the process of rubble—clearing that
precedes the erection of a new structure.
Probably it is not, Rather there are two factors at work, One is the
increasing realization of the extraordinary difficulty of settling disputes
with econometric evidence. Take for instance the issues of Ricardian
equivalence and excess volatility of asset prices. Both are quite
fundamental,both have been the subjects of intensiveempirical scrutiny, but
neither has yielded to the time series evidence brought to bear.70
What the implications of the lack of cutting power of time series
macroeconoftetric; may be remains to be seen. The use of panel data,
statisticalevents studies asinfinance, and careful case studies of
particular episodes, are all obvious possibilities.
The ;ecnd factor is thatitha; become fashionable, at least inthe
UnitedStates, to claim that economists have little to say on the policy
issues of the day, beyond recommending institutional reforms, That is the
comparative advantage of some. But it would not be progress for
macroeconomi;ts in general toavoid current policy issues, for instance by
arguingthat while wecan (perhaps) design agood budget rule, we cannot
answer the question ofwhetherthe budgetdeficit should becut now ornot.
The decision will be made, one way or the other, and the abdication of serious
nacroeconomists leaves the policy advice business to those either ignorant or
unscrupulous enough to claim full understanding of the issues.
Macroecoromists will not be able seriously to participate in such analyses
without the use of models, small or large, that attempt to quantify the impact
of policy decisions.
Finally one has to ask where the field is heading. There are two
correct answer;. One is that the field is no longer a field, that it is too
big for any researcher to describe her or himself a; a specialist in it, and
that much of macroeconomics will gradually meld into subspecialties and partly
be absorbed in existing fields.
The second is that macroeconomics will continue just as long as
macroeconomic fluctuations. If one further takes the (appropriate) view that
business fluctuations are not caused by one major set of shocks, nor71
propagatedrnin1y by a inqle inportant mecharrn, thenprogresswill have to
bemade in evaluating the significance of each mechanism and 4itting the
piecestogether. Thatis what macroeconometr i c models att empt to do; it
also what Kydland and Prescott attempt in their calibrated (1982) model.
Withinsuch models, the aggregate supply side remainsthe outstanding
challenge.72
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